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          Ada County Case No.  
          CR-2015-10218 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Hubbard failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing a unified sentence of three years, with six months fixed, upon the jury’s verdict 
finding him guilty of battery on a law enforcement officer? 
 
 
Hubbard Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 On July 15, 2015, Hubbard called 911 and falsely reported that there was a fire in 
 
 2 
the attic of his residence.  (PSI, p.58.1)  When officers and the fire department 
responded, Hubbard was behaving in a bizarre manner, was uncooperative, and 
provided a false name.  (PSI, pp.58-59, 76.)  He refused to answer officers’ questions or 
to remain seated and keep his hands visible as instructed.  (PSI, pp.58-59.)  Officers 
subsequently attempted to take Hubbard into custody, at which time Hubbard began 
resisting and a struggle ensued, during which Hubbard “acted as if he was going to 
punch [Officer Griffin] in the face with his right closed fist” and then “kicked [Officer 
Griffin] in [Officer Griffin’s] right thigh.”  (PSI, pp.59-60.)  A second officer (Officer Phan) 
deployed his Taser, and Hubbard “threw both of [his] hands down towards his sides and 
broke the wires.  He then squared off towards Officer Phan in a fighting stance” (PSI, 
p.60), with “both his fist[s] clenched and jaw clenched” (PSI, p.77).  Hubbard finally 
complied with the officers’ commands to lie on the ground after both officers pointed 
their Tasers at him, but he resumed resisting when the officers attempted to handcuff 
him.  (PSI, pp.60, 77.)  Officer Phan “conducted a ‘drive stun’” on Hubbard as Officer 
Griffin attempted to pull Hubbard’s arms behind his back; however, Hubbard continued 
to resist, grabbing at Officer Phan’s Taser and at Officer Griffin’s handgun.  (PSI, pp.60, 
77.)  Fire department personnel had to assist the officers in holding Hubbard down until 
backup arrived.  (PSI, p.77.)   
The state charged Hubbard with battery on a law enforcement officer and 
resisting or obstructing officers.  (R., pp.32-33.)  The case proceeded to trial and 
 
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Hubbard 
44402 psi.pdf.”   
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 Hubbard was ultimately found guilty of both counts.  (R., pp.106, 155.)  The district 
court imposed a unified sentence of three years, with six months fixed (with 364 days of 
credit for time served), for battery on a law enforcement officer, and a concurrent 180-
day jail sentence (with credit for 180 days served) for resisting or obstructing officers.  
(R., pp.189-93.)  Hubbard filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of 
conviction.  (R., pp.195-97.)   
Hubbard asserts his sentence for battery on a law enforcement officer is 
excessive in light of his substance abuse, purported acceptance of responsibility, and 
his continuing claim that he has “been motivated to make a big change in his life after 
the birth of his daughter.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.)  The record supports the sentence 
imposed.   
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire 
length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.  State v. McIntosh, 160 
Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 
217, 226 (2008).  It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
defendant's probable term of confinement.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 687, 391 (2007).  Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears 
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  McIntosh, 160 Idaho 
at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted)).  To carry this burden the appellant must show 
the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  Id.  A sentence is 
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting 
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or 
retribution.  Id.  The district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give 
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them differing weights when deciding upon the sentence.  Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; 
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment, deterrence and protection of 
society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).  “In deference to the trial judge, this 
Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds 
might differ.”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 146 Idaho at 
148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).  Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits 
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the 
trial court.”  Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).  
The maximum prison sentence for battery on a law enforcement officer is five 
years.  I.C. § 18-915(3).  The district court imposed a unified sentence of three years, 
with six months fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines.  (R., pp.189-93.)  
Furthermore, Hubbard’s sentence is reasonable in light of his ongoing criminal 
offending, refusal to abide by the terms of community supervision, and failure to 
rehabilitate or be deterred despite numerous prior legal sanctions and treatment 
opportunities.   
Hubbard has a lengthy criminal record that includes juvenile adjudications for 
possession of tobacco by a minor, four adjudications for possession of alcohol by a 
minor, petit theft, possession of marijuana/paraphernalia, DWP, DUI, reckless driving, 
and grand theft.  (PSI, pp.7-9.)  Between 2003 and 2011, Hubbard incurred criminal 
convictions for reckless driving, three convictions for possession of alcohol by a minor, 
failure to notify upon striking an unattended vehicle, two convictions for resisting or 
obstructing officers, three convictions for violation of a court order, possession of a 
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controlled substance, five convictions for DWP, two convictions for DUI, leaving the 
scene of an accident involving damage, failure to surrender driver’s license after 
suspension, domestic battery in the presence of a child, escape by one charged with or 
convicted of a misdemeanor, two convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia, and 
two convictions for battery.  (PSI, pp.10-14.)  Hubbard’s record also includes multiple 
probation violations; the state aptly argued, at sentencing, that Hubbard “has failed 
every form of supervision he’s ever been granted in every conceivable way.”  (7/12/16 
Tr., p.859, Ls.17-19; PSI, pp.11-14.)  Hubbard was on supervised probation for a felony 
DUI when he committed the instant offense; during the same period of time he also 
violated his probation in the DUI case by being discharged from treatment for 
noncompliance, failing to report for drug testing, failing to report for supervision as 
directed, and using alcohol, “bath salts,” and methamphetamine.  (PSI, p.4.)  Although 
Hubbard claims that he accepted responsibility for his behavior in the instant offense, he 
told the presentence investigator that he was “not guilty of” the offense – a statement 
that clearly indicates Hubbard is not accepting full responsibility for actually committing 
the crime in this case.  (PSI, p.27; Appellant’s brief, p.5.)   
On appeal, Hubbard also contends that the district court failed to adequately 
consider his substance abuse and his September 29, 2015 claim (during his 
presentence interview) that he is “now very motivated to change” because he “[is] a new 
daddy [and he] want[s] to be there for his little girl.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6; PSI, pp.2, 
27.)  Hubbard’s claim is doubtful, and is not supported by his past conduct or his more 
recent behavior in the months before he committed the instant offense.  In February 
2015 – approximately five months before he committed the instant offense – 31-year-old 
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Hubbard reported to a substance abuse evaluator that he began using alcohol at age 
five, cannabis at age 10, and “other” drugs at age 30.  (PSI, pp.111, 113.)  He further 
stated that he had a seven-month-old daughter, that he was highly motivated for 
treatment, and that he had quit using substances and was “about 100% ready to remain 
abstinent,” in part to “get his children back.”  (PSI, pp.112, 117-18.)  Despite these 
assurances, Hubbard continued to use bath salts on a daily basis over the ensuing 
months, even while he was participating in substance abuse treatment.  (PSI, pp.30, 
103.)  In July 2015, Hubbard checked into Allumbaugh House for Detox services after 
reporting continued daily use of bath salts; however, he failed to complete the program 
and checked himself out just two days later, against staff advice.  (PSI, pp.15, 103.)   
On July 7, Hubbard reported “increased motivation to be sober, to be present in 
his daughter’s life, a desire not to go to jail and willingness to participate in IOP 
treatment.”  (PSI, p.104.)  Nevertheless, Hubbard continued to use drugs, failed to 
report for probation supervision, was discharged from Pioneer Health Resources 
substance abuse treatment for noncompliance, and was again under the influence of 
bath salts when he committed the instant offense just one week later.  (PSI, pp.7, 38-
39.)  Pioneer Health Resources advised that Hubbard “remains at high risk at this time.”  
(PSI, pp.103, 105.)  Hubbard’s reiteration that he is still motivated to remain sober 
because he would like to be active in his daughter’s life – a claim he has made multiple 
times in the past – is belied by his unremitting substance abuse, even while in 
substance abuse treatment, and his failure to follow through with treatment and/or to 
hold himself accountable by submitting to drug testing as required.  (Appellant’s brief, 
p.3; PSI, pp.27, 30, 37-39, 103-04, 118.)   
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Hubbard’s probation officer described Hubbard as being “difficult and frustrating 
to supervise,” noting that he repeatedly disregarded his obligations while on probation, 
“constantly lied and manipulated his treatment providers,” moved without permission 
several times, appeared to be using drugs “‘the whole time on probation,’” and failed to 
show up for supervision appointments, drug testing, and his assigned treatment 
programs.  (PSI, p.15.)  Hubbard acknowledged that his probation officer “gave [him] a 
lot of chances” and “did everything she could to help [him].”  (PSI, p.15.)  Nevertheless, 
Hubbard failed to rehabilitate, or even to utilize the tools he previously learned in 
programming, despite having participated in a plethora of rehabilitative programs, 
including the Therapeutic Community program, TC Aftercare, Community Services 
Counseling, “CSC Stage and CSC The Idaho Model,” Pioneer Health Resources, the 
Rising Sun House, Victory in Christ treatment program, Allumbaugh House, and ABC 
and SAP classes.  (PSI, pp.15-16, 25-26, 30, 112, 125.)  Hubbard’s probation officer 
stated that Hubbard “is not a good candidate for supervised probation” (PSI, p.41), and 
the presentence investigator concluded that Hubbard presents a high risk to reoffend 
(PSI, p.28).   
The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed a 
reasonable sentence.  Hubbard’s sentence is appropriate in light of his ongoing criminal 
offending and substance abuse, refusal to abide by the terms of community supervision, 
and failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite numerous prior legal sanctions and 
treatment opportunities.  Given any reasonable view of the facts, Hubbard has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion   
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Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Hubbard’s conviction and 
sentence. 
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